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Considering Whether Medicaid Is Worth the
Cost: Revisiting the Oregon Health Study
The Oregon Health Study
was a groundbreaking ex-
periment inwhichuninsured
participants were random-
ized to either apply for Med-
icaidorstaywith theircurrent
care.
The study showed that
Medicaid produced numer-
ous important socioeco-
nomic and health benefits
but had no statistically sig-
nificant impactonhyperten-
sion, hypercholesterolemia,
or diabetes. Medicaid oppo-
nents interpreted the find-
ings to mean that Medicaid
is not a worthwhile invest-
ment. Medicaid proponents
viewed the experiment as
statistically underpowered
and, irrespective of the lab-
oratory values, suggestive
that Medicaid is a good in-
vestment.
We tested these compet-
ing claims and, using a sen-
sitive joint test and statistical
power analysis, confirmed
that the Oregon Health Study
did not improve laboratory
values. However, we also
found that Medicaid is a
good value, with a cost of
just $62 000 per quality-
adjusted life-years gained.
(Am J Public Health. Pub-
lished online ahead of print
March 19, 2015: e1–e5. doi:
10.2105/AJPH.2014.302485)
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MARK TWAIN IS BELIEVED TO
have penned the saying “There
are lies, damn lies, and statistics.”1
Even when working with gold stan-
dard data—a well-conducted ran-
domized trial of a social policy—
there is both an art and a science to
the analysis of the data at one’s
fingertips. Although social science
experiments are the most rigorous
means of evaluating a social policy,
they tend to be logistically messy,
requiring post hoc analytic adapta-
tions. It is often the case that less
than perfect policy experiments
come under fire in the media, par-
ticularly when the findings do not
align with a particular group’s be-
liefs. One recent example of this mix
of science and media politics can be
found in the case of the Oregon
Health Study (OHS).
In 2008, the state of Oregon
randomly provided Medicaid cov-
erage to approximately 10 000
individuals randomly selected
from 30 000 names drawn from
the 90 000 who were eligible for
Medicaid.2 An expert interdisci-
plinary research team collected
comprehensive survey responses,
administrative information, and
biomarker data on this subsample
of winners and losers of the lottery.
They found that Medicaid pro-
vided substantive financial protec-
tions, increased rates of preventive
testing, reduced depression, and
improved self-rated health.2 They
also found that those randomized
to receive Medicaid did not achieve
a statistically significant reduction
in blood pressure, serum choles-
terol levels, or blood glucose levels.
However, relatively few of
those who won the right to enroll
in Medicaid actually did, and those
who did turned out to be quite
healthy to begin with. This greatly
reduced the effective sample size
of the “treated” group—those par-
ticipants who were assigned to
receive Medicaid. Further compli-
cating matters, Oregon rapidly ac-
celerated enrollment when more
funds became available. This
greatly shortened the time that the
researchers had for data collec-
tion.2 These complications led to
a less than perfect experiment.
As a result of these issues, some
researchers pointed out that the
study was statistically “underpow-
ered,”3 meaning that the number
of participants should have been
larger. These researchers based
their claims on post hoc statistical
analyses of each individual labo-
ratory measure. For example, they
showed that there were only 80
participants who might qualify as
diabetic, and many more would
have been needed to detect a
meaningful reduction in diabetes.4
Proponents of Medicaid point to
these flaws to suggest that conclu-
sions cannot be drawn about the
effectiveness of Medicaid in im-
proving these laboratory measures
of health. They further note that,
even if one sets the laboratory
results aside, the other benefits are
important, meaningful, and worth
the investment.5 Various oppo-
nents of Medicaid, conversely,
tended to focus on the null results
in the laboratory tests and de-
clared that the study “proved” that
Medicaid is a poor policy invest-
ment.6---8 Supporting these claims,
the OHS authors objectively note
that the joint effect of all the tests
combined was also not statistically
significant.2 This suggests that
even if one considers the impacts
of all the tests together, the OHS
still fails to show statistically ro-
bust improvements in laboratory
measures of health.
The arguments of bothMedicaid
proponents and opponents are
plausible. They rest on concerns
about whether (1) the improve-
ments in laboratory values would
have been statistically significant
had the OHS sample been larger
and (2) the nonlaboratory benefits
that were realized are meaningful
enough to justify further expansion
of Medicaid. We have addressed
the first concern by conducting
a highly sensitive joint test coupled
with a post hoc power analysis of
this test. If this test, which is more
sensitive than is the one the authors
originally used, is powerful enough
to detect combined differences in
laboratory values, it should validate
or refute the critique that the sam-
ple size was too small. To address
the second concern, we performed
a cost-effectiveness analysis and
a cost---benefit analysis to test the





One aspect of the art of social
science experiments is deciding
the extent to which one might err
on the side of a type I error or
a type II error9—or, more simply,
deciding whether one wishes to
use an approach that moves the
study more toward acceptance of
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a false positive or a false negative
finding.
Unlike drug trials or biological
experiments in which experimen-
tal conditions can be more tightly
controlled, social experiments
have many moving pieces. In
a drug trial, for instance, partici-
pants can be closely monitored to
ensure that they take their medi-
cation (be it the placebo or the
control). However, the most care-
ful and experienced research
teams cannot control a person’s
choice of whether to actually en-
roll in a government program if
they win the right to do so. They
also cannot control the decisions
of policymakers, who are much
more motivated to act according
to politics than science when
a policy is implemented. Finally,
there also tend to be challenges
associated with multiple and
overlapping outcome measures,
participants who switch between
treatment and control arms of the
study, and a requirement for long
follow-up times to detect impor-
tant health outcomes, such as
mortality.10
With respect to the issue of
overlapping outcome measures,
consider Medicaid, which may
both improve health and provide
protection against catastrophic
medical costs.2,11 These outcome
measures overlap; whereas poor
health can impoverish a family,
higher income is thought to make
poor people healthier,12 and it is
virtually impossible to disentangle
these 2 effects.12
With the prospect of a pile of
messy experimental data that will
displease reviewers and readers
alike, social scientists tend to take
the most tidy, rigorous analytical
path. Without these protections,
not only is there uncertainty
about positive outcomes, but
there also exists the potential for
the researchers to change model
specifications or remove partici-
pants with missing or otherwise
undesirable values (e.g., outliers)
until statistical significance is
achieved. As a result, researchers
tend to prespecify their statistical
approach and to employ intent to
treat analysis.
In intent to treat, all participants
in the experimental (treatment)
group are regarded as treated,
whether they actually received
the treatment, withdrew from the
study, or deviated from the pro-
tocol. This generally increases the
number of participants that are
needed to observe a result and
reduces the measured impact
(effect size) of the study outcome
measures. For instance, in the
OHS, only half of the participants
who won the right to enroll in
Medicaid actually did, but all of
them were included as treated. So,
if Medicaid actually reduced the
chance of depression among
treated participants by 30%, the
measured benefit would only
be half of that, or 15%. On the
upside, intent to treat all but elim-
inates problems associated with
selection bias that might produce
a false positive, thereby reducing
the chances of a false positive re-
sult. Moreover, if the sample size
is large enough, it is possible to
correct the effect size (e.g., effec-
tively multiplying the 15% rate
of depression by 2).
Of course, any attempt to avoid
a false positive result also in-
creases one’s chances of a false
negative result. It is notoriously
difficult to estimate how many
participants will actually choose
to be treated, stay in their experi-
mental group, receive alternative
forms of community insurance,
and so forth. When one applies
more rigor to crunching the
numbers, more participants are
needed. In the worst case, a pro-
gram that was actually socially
beneficial could be found to pro-
duce no statistically significant ef-
fects at all. This could discourage
policymaking and might even dis-
courage future research in the
topic at hand—few researchers
wish to spend their time and effort
evaluating a program that is un-
likely to produce results.
So, therein lies the problem.
Rigor can be used to reduce one’s
chances of a false positive, but
rigor can also increase one’s
chances of producing false nega-
tive results. A false result is objec-
tively undesirable whether it is
a false positive or a false negative.
The art of social experiments lies
in how the lines are drawn and
how the results are presented. In
the case of the OHS, the authors
chose to generally err on the side
of rigor. They presented the OHS
as having an impact on important
outcomes, such as financial protec-
tions, depression, and preventive
screening, but not on laboratory
values.
It is the latter claims that cre-
ated a political storm because
laboratory values were the pri-
mary objective measure of physi-
cal health in the study. This raises
the key question: if Medicaid does
not improve physical health, why are
we spending hundreds of billions of




Although little can be done to
circumvent problems that arose
during the OHS, it is possible to
address the concerns raised by
proponents and opponents of
Medicaid in this case. For instance,
post hoc power analyses can in-
form the consumer of whether the
initial sample size estimate was
large enough to ensure sufficient
power to draw sound conclusions.
It is also possible to conduct more
sensitive joint tests across all
outcome measures rather than
perform separate tests for each
individual outcome. This will tell
us whether the overall effect of
Medicaid on laboratory measures
was meaningful in any way across
measures. If a sensitive joint test
across all laboratory markers
proves to be adequate to detect
changes in laboratory values but
fails to produce statistically signif-
icant results, we can be more
confident of the results.
Finally, it is important to ad-
dress the ultimate question that
arises from the failure of the OHS
to produce improvements in lab-
oratory measures: is Medicaid
worth the investment of hundreds
of billions of dollars? Economic
analyses allow us to answer this
question.13 In the case of the OHS,
the outcome measures that grab
the headlines—such as the effect of
Medicaid on cholesterol or blood
pressure levels—are by no means
the only or even the best measures
of Medicaid’s value to society. The
presence of other benefits does
not mean, however, that it makes
sense for the government to pay
for them.
To answer that question,
a much more comprehensive look
at Medicaid is needed. Such an
analysis would include estimates
of its joint benefits and an estimate
of how much it costs to realize
these benefits. This type of analy-
sis addresses concerns from Med-
icaid opponents that the program
is not worth taxpayers’ investment.
OUR APPROACHES
We revisited the findings of
the OHS using a post hoc power
analysis, a uniquely sensitive test
of joint effects (seemingly unre-
lated regression),14 and a basic
cost-effectiveness analysis.
ANALYTIC ESSAYS
e2 | Analytic Essays | Peer Reviewed | Muennig et al. American Journal of Public Health | Published online ahead of print March 19, 2015
Power Analysis
In the OHS, most of the out-
comes of interest appeared to be
statistically trending in a way that
favored the treatment arm, and it
has been argued that the statistical
power of the experiment was too
low to detect meaningful effects.15
In conjunction with 2 biostatisti-
cians at Columbia University, we
used Columbia University’s high-
performance UNIX computers to
determine the power associated
with the Hotelling 2-sample T2
test, a multivariable version of the
t test, across all the biomarkers in
our analysis.16 For the power cal-
culation, we used the original
study data to input the vector
of mean differences (treated vs
nontreated) associated with each
biomarker and the pooled vari-
ance---covariance matrix for the 2
groups. We performed these cal-
culations in Power Analysis and
Sample Size software (NCSS,
Kaysville, UT). Additional infor-
mation is available as a supple-




We next set out to perform
a more sensitive joint test than was
employed in the original study.
Seemingly unrelated regression
uses a single variance---covariance
matrix across multiple seemingly
unrelated regression equations.14
In seemingly unrelated regression,
multiple equations that appear
unrelated (e.g., a model with cho-
lesterol as a dependent variable
and another with hypertension as
a dependent variable) are actually
related via a correlation in their
error terms. To be specific, the
errors of the linear equations are
correlated across equations for
a particular individual but are un-
correlated across participants. By
estimating multiple equations to-
gether, we greatly improve the
statistical efficiency of the estima-
tors over fitting the models sepa-
rately. Seemingly unrelated re-
gression has been used to detect
joint effects across similarly mod-
est effect sizes for health outcomes
in much smaller studies than the
OHS.17,18
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Our objective in estimating the
cost-effectiveness of Medicaid was
to simply ask if Medicaid is worth
its cost. Recall that Medicaid was
associated with financial protec-
tions, higher rates of diagnosis and
treatment of diseases, a higher
chance that a recipient will receive
preventive care (such as a colono-
scopy or breast cancer screening),
and lower rates of clinical depres-
sion. We included only the value
of the observed, statistically sig-
nificant reduction in clinical de-
pression relative to the full cost of
Medicaid to obtain a lower-bound
estimate of the overall cost-
effectiveness of Medicaid. Because
none of the observed outcomes
were harmful and because all costs
were included, one can be much
more certain that the combined
effects of all benefits of Medicaid
are cost-effective.
The value of the financial pro-
tections afforded by health insur-
ance to families that are faced with
paying for catastrophic medical
coverage is certainly large, but we
did not attempt to measure it. This
is in part because it may present
a challenge to the validity of the
overall cost-effectiveness ratio.
Specifically, it is not clear to what
extent financial protections re-
duced depression, and it is not
clear to what extent reduced de-
pression improves financial pro-
tections. Including this benefit
might lead to double counting
of important benefits.
The expert US Task Force on
Clinical Preventive Services esti-
mates that preventive measures
such as mammography do save
lives,19 but there is no experimen-
tal evidence that proves this.
Likewise, higher rates of screening
and treating for disease should be
lifesaving,20 but again, this has not
been proven, and so these benefits
are not included. By excluding
these potential benefits while
including all their costs, we can
be more certain that the cost-
effectiveness ratio is a conserva-
tive estimate of overall benefits.
We also did not count nonstatisti-
cally significant benefits to blood
pressure, cholesterol, or glycemic
index. We adopted the societal
perspective, and we have pre-
sented the costs in 2013 dollars,
which we adjusted using the Con-
sumer Price Index.21
The health-related quality of
life measure used in the OHS, the
SF-8, cannot be used to calcul-
ate quality-adjusted life-years
(QALYs), which is the primary
effectiveness outcome in cost-
effectiveness analyses.22 We
therefore turned to the literature
to obtain the EQ-5D score change
associated remission of moderate
depression.4 Finally, to conduct
a cost---benefit analysis, we simply
monetized QALYs using 1 com-
monly used value ($100 000/
QALY)23 adjusted to 2013 dollars
($130 000) using the Consumer
Price Index.21
When considering costs, it is im-
portant to be mindful that Medicaid
is paid for by taking money from
taxpayers and giving it to those
who qualify for Medicaid. Costs
are only meaningful to the extent
that these funds change medical
utilization or produce administra-
tive costs. After adjustment for
inflation, the marginal increase
in medical costs was $1213.2
To this, we added the 7.00%
administrative cost associated with
running Medicaid, for a cost of
$1298.24 We divided these costs
by the product of EQ-5D score
change (0.23)25 and the difference
in positive depression screens
(9.15%).2 The assumptions of this
analysis are listed in Table 1.
OUR FINDINGS
There were 6315 treated par-
ticipants and 5769 control partic-
ipants in the final study after
removing those with missing values.
This produced a statistical power
of 69% to detect an effect size of
0.06 equal to the differences of
the group means of the 6 response
variables under study adjusted by
the variance---covariance matrix.
Roughly 7500 participants would
have been needed in each group
to achieve a statistical power of
0.8 at this a. All calculations con-
sidered a type I error of 0.05.
The joint test indicated that the
laboratory tests for all biomarkers
were not significantly different
between the 2 groups (P= .7). This
was true whether the analysis was
limited to those older than 50
years (P= .13) or those with pre-
existing conditions (P= .56).
Under the assumptions that the
provision of preventive medical
care saves no lives and treating
clinical depression saves no lives,
the incremental cost-effectiveness
ratio of providing Medicaid in
terms of depression alone was
$62 000 per QALY gained. Us-
ing the common valuation of
$130 000 per QALY,23 this
suggests a net savings of at least
$68 000. Revealed preference
and contingent valuation ap-
proaches (alternative, theory-
grounded methods for valuing
QALYs) put the savings signifi-
cantly higher—as much as a half
a million dollars.26 The results
are summarized in Table 2.
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CONCLUSIONS
The OHS produced clear bene-
fits for the recipients with respect
to financial protection (what many
would argue health insurance is
meant for) and reduced depres-
sion, increased diagnosis and
treatment of diabetes, and in-
creased preventive medical care.2
These overall impacts were larger
than were those found in an older
randomized trial of private health
insurance.11
At $62 000 per QALY gained
(or a net return of at least $68 000
per enrollee to society as a whole),
Medicaid seems worth the
investment—even when we ignore
the significant benefits associated
with increased prevention, in-
creased diagnosis and treatment of
disease, and financial protections
for the family. This incremental
cost-effectiveness ratio is well be-
low the cost of most medical and
social policy investments that we
as a society choose to make, such
as treating disabling spinal prob-
lems27 or placing smoke detectors
in homes.28 These findings are
remarkably similar to earlier as-
sessments of the cost-effectiveness
of private health insurance and
Medicare that were made using
Oaxaca decompositions of pro-
spective survey data entered into
decision analysis models.29,30
Whether it produced meaning-
ful physical health benefits is still
an open question. Our power es-
timates show that Medicaid had
little impact on laboratory tests,
even when the benefits of all the
laboratory tests are considered
together. This in turn raises ques-
tions that go far beyond the ben-
efits of Medicaid. Conventional
wisdom holds that clinical services
(e.g., cholesterol screening) im-
prove the clinical laboratory bio-
markers tested in this experiment
(e.g., cholesterol).31,32 Although
the OHS was clearly inadequately
powered to detect a statistically
significant difference in any single
test, a lack of benefit across all
these tests together raises some
questions about the real-world
validity of some of these recom-
mendations.
This may be because recom-
mendations tend to be partly de-
rived from clinical studies con-
ducted under tightly controlled
conditions. In the real world, those
who are prescribed drugs may not
take them, or they may take them
in combination with a wide array
of other medications. Participants
in clinical trials might also be very
different from Medicaid recipients
with respect to behavioral risk
factors and the use of other sub-
stances.
However, the additional infor-
mation about the OHS that we
gleaned from extensive qualitative
analyses of participants years after
the study was completed does
suggest that some clinical benefits
were realized.33 Many inter-
viewees felt that their health had
improved substantially (in line
with the finding that self-rated
health improved by 25% in the
original study). Moreover, many of
these interviewees felt that their
benefits came years, rather than
months, after enrollment. The in-
terviews suggest that the limited
follow-up of the study may have
produced an undercounting of
benefits. The potential psycholog-
ical impact of being eligible for
TABLE 2—Summary of Our Findings
Outcome Finding
Joint test The joint analysis implemented through seemingly unrelated regression models overall indicated that the laboratory tests were not significantly different between
the “treated” (Medicaid participants) and the “untreated” groups.
Power analysis Our joint test was able to detect differences in the combined impact of Medicaid on laboratory tests at 70% power. Therefore, we concluded that treated
participants did not realize improvements in laboratory values.
Cost-effectiveness analysis When considering all health and economic benefits, Medicaid comes at a better value than do many other social policy and health investments ($62 000 per
quality-adjusted life-year gained).
TABLE 1—Assumptions Used in the Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Assumption Explanation Influence
All costs should be included, but only reductions in
depression should be included as benefits.
By only including the most certain benefits, we reduce the
chance of double counting benefits or including benefits
that were not experimentally tested.
This ensures that the ICER value represents a maximum value.
One year of Medicaid investment produces 1 year of benefits. It is likely that depression rates would return to baseline rates
were Medicaid withdrawn.
Because benefits other than depression treatment may be
longer lasting (e.g., colonoscopy screening), this assumption
also ensures that the ICER represents a maximum value.
Secondary data sources accurately reflect measured
reductions in depression in this experiment.
It is necessary to use a specialized instrument to calculate
quality-adjusted life-years, and this instrument was not
included in the original experiment.
Unknown.
Note. ICER = incremental cost-effectiveness value.
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Medicaid on well-being should
also not be discounted.
We find that Medicaid might
not do much for high cholesterol,
blood pressure, or blood sugar,
but it is still a very good invest-
ment. j
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